Generally, the public-key cryptographic schemes base their security on the difficulty of solving hard mathematical problems. The number of such problems currently known is relative reduced. Therefore the further investigation of mathematical problems with applications in cryptography is of central interest. This paper explores a new problem based on polynomial composition. We analyze the connections between the proposed problem and the RSA problem. Adjacent, we derive from it a zero -knowledge identification protocol. We show that the method allows the definition of a commutative class of polynomials. Based on this class, a "Diffie -Hellman like" key exchange protocol can be devised. .
INTRODUCTION
In cryptography, an asymmetric algorithm is based on a type of function first suggested by Diffie and Hellman (Diffie, Hellman, 1976) that has special properties known as trapdoor one-way functions. A trapdoor one-way function, if given some additional secret information, allows much easier computation of its inverse function. The one-way functions are based on hard mathematical problems, like factoring large composites into prime factors or the discrete logarithm problem.
Nevertheless, the number of hard mathematical problems with applications in cryptography currently known is rather reduced. Even considering the known problems of this type, there are still questionable items. As an example, the Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) has never been proven secure against the chosen ciphertext attack in the adaptive scenario (RSA, 2007) .
In this context, the further research of such problems is of central interest. Similarly, finding general procedures supporting the study of a larger class of problems is also important.
The Polynomial Composition Problem (PCP) was first introduced in (Joye, Naccache, Porte, 2004) and can be enounced as follows:
Problem 1.

Let P and Q be two polynomials in (Z/nZ)[X]where n is an RSA modulus. Given polynomials Q and S:=Q(P), find P.
Joye et al. shown that generally the Polynomial Composition Problem is easier than the RSA problem -that is the computation of roots in Z/nZand gave a new version of this problem called "Reduced Polynomial Composition Problem" (RPCP), which can be proven to be equivalent with the RSA problem.
A number of cryptographic algorithms like the key agreement protocols based on asymmetric techniques (Menez, van Oorschot, Vanderstone, 1997) require operating in commutative groups. It is well known that generally, the polynomial composition is not commutative.
The present paper introduces a new problem called Polynomial Multi -Composition Problem (PMCP) based on a commutative class of polynomials.
In a proper approach, the security of the cryptographic scheme should be proven in a mathematical sense, i.e. establishing theorems claiming that illegal actions such as impersonation are as difficult as solving a specific problem, whose difficulty is well-established. Among these problems, as already mentioned, are integer factorization, or the computation of discrete logarithms in a finite group. This will also be the approach in the present paper, relating the new introduced polynomial multi-composition problem to the reducible polynomial composition problem suggested in (Joye, Naccache, Porte, 2004) .
Half-way between heuristic validation and formal proofs are proofs in a model where concrete objects are replaced by some ideal substitutes. Applying this paradigm to hash functions for example, yields the so-called oracle model described in (Bellare, Rogaway, 1993) .
Using the following notation for a polynomial composed k -times with itself: (1) we can enounce the Polynomial MultiComposition Problem as follows:
where n is an RSA modulus and k a big positive integer,
. Given k and the polynomial
We observe that choosing polynomials of type
can lead to the definition of a commutative class of polynomials. For example, if we consider P, Q, R polynomials in Z/nZ[X] and
, then the polynomials R and S are commutative over Z/nZ. For any
(2) This property allows us to devise a key exchange protocol based on polynomials in (Z/nZ) [X] similarly with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol ((Menez, van Oorschot, Vanderstone, 1997) Protocol 12.47).
ANALYSIS OF THE POLYNOMIAL MULTI-COMPOSITION PROBLEM
In analyzing the security of the PMCP we relate the suggested problem to the Reduced Polynomial Composition Problem (RPCP) as given in (Joye, Naccache, Porte, 2004) . Consequently, we need to define a stronger problem in order to meet the usual cryptographic requirements. We introduce in the following the Reducible Polynomial Multi -Composition Problem (RPMCP).
Problem 3. Let P be a polynomial in Z/nZ[X] where n is an RSA modulus and r a big integer
As proven in (Joye, Naccache, Porte, 2004) 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATIONS
A Simple PMCP -based Identification Protocol
We suggest the following identification protocol based on PMCP: In order to set up the system, a Trusted Third Party (TTP) selects and publishes an RSA modulus n. Each user chooses a polynomial P in (Z/nZ) [X] and some big integers q, r and s 
in (Z/nZ)[X] and registers the polynomials S and Q and the integers q, r and s with the TTP. S and Q represent user's public key and will be made publicly available. Nevertheless, after calculating R, the user will keep it secret. P is user's secret key.
To prove the knowledge of P the user executes l times the following protocol: Figure 1 : A simple identification protocol.
A Diffie -Hellman Like Key Agreement Protocol based on PMCP
Based on the property (2) 
3. Protocol actions. Perform the following steps each time a shared key is required.
(a) A chooses a random secret l, 2 1 − ≤ < n l , and sends B the message (i). (b) B chooses a random secret r, 2 1 − ≤ < n r , and sends A the message (ii). 
and computes the shared key as
Note that in the set scenario, the polynomial
is known but the big integers l and r are secret. An adversary tapping the communication between A and B can catch the messages of type (i) and (ii) sent between the two parties. The adversary can also calculate ) (ω P as P and ω are public.
Nevertheless, in order to determine the values l and r and therefore to be able to determine the shared key K, she will have to solve a problem equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem, which is known as being hart.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The present paper introduced a new cryptographic primitive called Polynomial Multi -Composition Problem. We shown that this polynomial class define a commutative group towards polynomial composition. This propriety gave us the possibility to define a key exchange protocol. A zeroknowledge identification scheme based on the mentioned primitive was also presented. It is interesting to note that the Polynomial Composition Problem gives a general framework for studying a wider class of cryptographic primitives. We believe that a deeper study of the Polynomial Composition Problem could lead to a better understanding of the actual cryptographic problems.
